What does section 141 require for proof?
(1) In a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved...
View section 141
Commentary, legislation and relevant authorities. This guide covers Part 4.1 sections 141–145.
sections 141–145
(1) In a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved...
View section 141(1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, in any proceeding the court is to find that the facts necessary for deciding— (a) a...
View section 142(1) Proof is not required about the provisions and coming into operation (in whole or in part) of— (a) an Act, an Imperial Act in force...
View section 143(1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is— (a) common knowledge in the locality in which...
View section 144This Part does not exclude the application of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity relating to the effect of a...
View section 145Section 141 of the Evidence Act 1995 governs criminal proceedings: standard of proof. It forms part of the Act's structured approach to admissibility and proof, and practitioners should treat the section as a distinct rule with its own conditions, exceptions and onus. (1) In a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The legislative scheme is directed to ensuring that only appropriate material is received in proceedings. In practical terms, the section operates where in a criminal proceeding, the court is not to find the case of the prosecution proved unless it is satisfied that it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Parties should identify the provision.
The application of section 141 is illustrated in Barber v The King (07 November 2025)[2025] NSWCCA 179 (Garling, Ierace and Dhanji JJ) at [22]. as can be seen, s 29(b) has no application to the present case. The applicant was thus deemed to have been in possession of the drug for the purposes of supply unless he proved that he had “the.
A further example is Prime Marble & Granite Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW (24 June 2024)[2024] NSWCCA 105; 332 IR 365 (Harrison CJ, Cl, Hamill and N Adams JJ) at [30], where the Court applied section 141 in context. This Court in Somerville applied the following principles with respect to the determination of the question of when the offence first came to notice of the regulator: The onus is on the defendant. The reasoning also shows how appellate courts review section 141 rulings for consistency with the Act.
Practical takeaway:
Barber v The King (07 November 2025)[2025] NSWCCA 179 (Garling, Ierace and Dhanji JJ) at [22]
“As can be seen, s 29(b) has no application to the present case. The applicant was thus deemed to have been in possession of the drug for the purposes of supply unless he proved that he had “the prohibited drug in his possession otherwise than for supply”. The applicant’s onus was to prove that fact on the balance of probabilities: Evidence Act 1995, s 141(2); R v Carey (1990) 20 NSWLR 292 at 294; (1990) 50 A Crim R 163; McEwen v R (1998) 99 A Crim R 421.”
Guiding proposition:
As can be seen, s 29(b) has no application to the present case. The applicant was thus deemed to have been in possession of the drug for the purposes of supply unless he proved that he had “the...
Prime Marble & Granite Pty Ltd v SafeWork NSW (24 June 2024)[2024] NSWCCA 105; 332 IR 365 (Harrison CJ, Cl, Hamill and N Adams JJ) at [30]
“This Court in Somerville applied the following principles with respect to the determination of the question of when the offence first came to notice of the regulator: The onus is on the defendant to establish on the balance of probabilities, in line with s 141(2) of the Evidence Act 1995, that evidence of the offending came to the attention of the regulator earlier than the date specified in the s
“ummons; A regulator may have reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been committed, sufficient properly to exercise statutory investigation powers, but not yet have evidence of the commission of an offence for the purposes of the time limit provision. In other words, time will not necessarily, and is not likely to, run from the time the investigation starts, but rather from the time the inve”
Guiding proposition:
This Court in Somerville applied the following principles with respect to the determination of the question of when the offence first came to notice of the regulator: The onus is on the defendant...
Section 142 of the Evidence Act 1995 governs admissibility of evidence: standard of proof. It forms part of the Act's structured approach to admissibility and proof, and practitioners should treat the section as a distinct rule with its own conditions, exceptions and onus. (1) Except as otherwise provided by this Act, in any proceeding the court is to find that the facts necessary for deciding— (a) a question whether evidence shou.
The legislative scheme is directed to ensuring that only appropriate material is received in proceedings. In practical terms, the section operates where except as otherwise provided by this Act, in any proceeding the court is to find that the facts necessary for deciding a question whether evidence should be admitted or not admitted, whether in.
The application of section 142 is illustrated in Toth v State of New South Wales (21 September 2022)[2022] NSWCA 185 (Brereton and Kirk JJA, Basten AJA) at [55] of New South Wales (21 September 2022)[2022] NSWCA 185 (Brereton and Kirk JJA, Basten AJA) at [55]. officers Fotofili and Mina did not give evidence below. That would not prevent an inference being drawn about their state of knowledge if sufficiently supported by the evidence, taking account of. That decision confirms that.
A further example is Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd (formerly known as Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd) v Calleja (26 February 2018)[2018] NSWCA 26 (Basten, Gleeson and Leeming JJA) at [96], where the Court applied section 142 in context. The primary judge was correct to proceed on the basis that the onus lay on Prime to satisfy the conditions in s 69(1) and (2). However, with respect, the “unequivocal clarity” to which the primary. The reasoning also shows how appellate courts review section 142 rulings for consistency with the Act.
Practical takeaway:
Toth v State of New South Wales (21 September 2022)[2022] NSWCA 185 (Brereton and Kirk JJA, Basten AJA) at [55]
“Officers Fotofili and Mina did not give evidence below. That would not prevent an inference being drawn about their state of knowledge if sufficiently supported by the evidence, taking account of the fact that deliberately or recklessly acting beyond power in imposing a restriction on Mr Toth’s freedom is a relatively grave allegation to make: cf Evidence Act, s 142. But Mr Toth identified no evid
“ence supporting any such inference. His legal argument about the scope of the directions power is not so obvious as to support a natural inference that the officers must have known that, or been recklessly indifferent as to whether, the impugned directions were beyond power.”
Guiding proposition:
Officers Fotofili and Mina did not give evidence below. That would not prevent an inference being drawn about their state of knowledge if sufficiently supported by the evidence, taking account of...
Capital Securities XV Pty Ltd (formerly known as Prime Capital Securities Pty Ltd) v Calleja (26 February 2018)[2018] NSWCA 26 (Basten, Gleeson and Leeming JJA) at [96]
“The primary judge was correct to proceed on the basis that the onus lay on Prime to satisfy the conditions in s 69(1) and (2). However, with respect, the “unequivocal clarity” to which the primary judge referred discloses error. It was sufficient for Prime to establish to the civil standard the facts necessary for deciding whether s 69 was satisfied: s 142.”
Guiding proposition:
The primary judge was correct to proceed on the basis that the onus lay on Prime to satisfy the conditions in s 69(1) and (2). However, with respect, the “unequivocal clarity” to which the primary...
Section 143 of the Evidence Act 1995 governs matters of law. It forms part of the Act's structured approach to admissibility and proof, and practitioners should treat the section as a distinct rule with its own conditions, exceptions and onus. (1) Proof is not required about the provisions and coming into operation (in whole or in part) of— (a) an Act, an Imperial Act in force in Australia, a Commonwe.
The legislative scheme is directed to ensuring that only appropriate material is received in proceedings. In practical terms, the section operates where proof is not required about the provisions and coming into operation (in whole or in part) of an Act, an Imperial Act in force in Australia, a Commonwealth Act, an Act of another.
The application of section 143 is illustrated in Wu v Fairfield City Council (26 October 2023)[2023] NSWCATAP 288 (A Britton, Deputy P, Dr J Lucy, Senior Member) at [55]. the appellant relied upon a number of statutory provisions which she said gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear her application. Those were: ss 68, 439, 440, 440AAA, 478 and 482 of the Local.
A further example is Wu v Fairfield City Council (26 October 2023)[2023] NSWCATAP 288 (A Britton, Deputy P, Dr J Lucy, Senior Member) at [55], where the Court applied section 143 in context. Sections 140, 143, 144, 154 and 155 of the Evidence Act , which the appellant relied upon on appeal, have no bearing on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. They do not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal. The reasoning also shows how appellate courts review section 143 rulings for consistency with the Act.
Practical takeaway:
Wu v Fairfield City Council (26 October 2023)[2023] NSWCATAP 288 (A Britton, Deputy P, Dr J Lucy, Senior Member) at [55]
“The appellant relied upon a number of statutory provisions which she said gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear her application. Those were: ss 68, 439, 440, 440AAA, 478 and 482 of the Local Government Act; s 2.12 of the State Environmental Planning Policy (Exempt and Complying Development Codes); ss 140, 143, 144, 154 and 155 of the Evidence Act 1995; and ss 88A, 88B and 88C of the Conveyancing Act.”
Guiding proposition:
The appellant relied upon a number of statutory provisions which she said gave the Tribunal jurisdiction to hear her application. Those were: ss 68, 439, 440, 440AAA, 478 and 482 of the Local...
Wu v Fairfield City Council (26 October 2023)[2023] NSWCATAP 288 (A Britton, Deputy P, Dr J Lucy, Senior Member) at [69]
“Sections 140, 143, 144, 154 and 155 of the Evidence Act, which the appellant relied upon on appeal, have no bearing on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. They do not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal.”
Guiding proposition:
Sections 140, 143, 144, 154 and 155 of the Evidence Act, which the appellant relied upon on appeal, have no bearing on the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. They do not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal.
Section 144 of the Evidence Act 1995 governs matters of common knowledge. It forms part of the Act's structured approach to admissibility and proof, and practitioners should treat the section as a distinct rule with its own conditions, exceptions and onus. (1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is— (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being .
The legislative scheme is directed to ensuring that only appropriate material is received in proceedings. In practical terms, the section operates where proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or generally or capable of verification.
The application of section 144 is illustrated in Karout v New South Wales Crime Commission [2025] NSWCA 260 at [121]. section 144(1) provides: 144 Matters of common knowledge (1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is— (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the. The reasoning shows how the section is applied to the facts, submissions and procedural context of the particular.
A further example is Karout v New South Wales Crime Commission [2025] NSWCA 260 at [121], where the Court applied section 144 in context. The grounds are: 4 His Honour erred in failing to be satisfied that the following amounts were monies from other sources, unrelated to an illegal activity or activities, in circumstances where. The reasoning also shows how appellate courts review section 144 rulings for consistency with the Act.
Practical takeaway:
Karout v New South Wales Crime Commission (09 December 2025)[2025] NSWCA 260 (Kirk and Adamson JJA, Griffiths AJA) at [43]
“Section 144(1) provides: 144 Matters of common knowledge (1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is— (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the proceeding is being held or generally, or (b) capable of verification by reference to a document the authority of which cannot reasonably be questioned.”
Guiding proposition:
Section 144(1) provides: 144 Matters of common knowledge (1) Proof is not required about knowledge that is not reasonably open to question and is— (a) common knowledge in the locality in which the...
Karout v New South Wales Crime Commission (09 December 2025)[2025] NSWCA 260 (Kirk and Adamson JJA, Griffiths AJA) at [157]
“The grounds are: 4 His Honour erred in failing to be satisfied that the following amounts were monies from other sources, unrelated to an illegal activity or activities, in circumstances where those monies were transferred to the appellant as loans by the witnesses, and, despite the rule in Browne v. Dunn (1893) 6 R 67, it was not suggested to the witnesses by the respondent that they had been i
“nvolved in any illegal activity: a. Loan of $1,070,000 from Ms. Hannan [sic, Hanan] Elgammal (at [50]); b. Payment of $17,000 from Mr Faraj Issa (at [60]) (not pressed); c. Payments totalling $250,000 from Mr Joseph Samia (at [67]); d. Payments of $123,000 from Mr Barton/Ms Sin and other transactions (at [86]).”
Guiding proposition:
The grounds are: 4 His Honour erred in failing to be satisfied that the following amounts were monies from other sources, unrelated to an illegal activity or activities, in circumstances where...
Section 145 of the Evidence Act 1995 governs certain crown certificates. It forms part of the Act's structured approach to admissibility and proof, and practitioners should treat the section as a distinct rule with its own conditions, exceptions and onus. This Part does not exclude the application of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity relating to the effect of a certificate given by or on be.
The legislative scheme is directed to ensuring that only appropriate material is received in proceedings. In practical terms, the section operates where this Part does not exclude the application of the principles and rules of the common law and of equity relating to the effect of a certificate given by or on behalf of the.
The application of section 145 is illustrated in Ure v Commonwealth of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241.
A further example is Ure v Commonwealth of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71] of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71], where the Court applied section 145 in context. I suggested to the solicitor for the mother that I could take.
Practical takeaway:
Ure v Commonwealth of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [71]
“Further in this connection, despite the respondents’ submission to the contrary, I do not accept that an allegation made by the Commonwealth in a pleading has the status or incidence of a formal statement by the executive arm of government on an act of State of the kind to which the cases refer. Once again, the cases to which I was taken contain no such finding, do not illustrate that proposition,
“ or justify such a conclusion. The respondents’ submission blurs the distinction between the pleadings, which function to define the issues for resolution in the proceeding in accordance with the applicable rules of court (see, here, Div 16.1 FCR), and the material on which the Court acts to make relevant findings of fact to determine those issues. The distinction is the traditional one between al”
Guiding proposition:
Further in this connection, despite the respondents’ submission to the contrary, I do not accept that an allegation made by the Commonwealth in a pleading has the status or incidence of a formal...
Ure v Commonwealth of Australia (17 March 2015)[2015] FCA 241; 323 ALR 164 (Yates J) at [58]
“I suggested to the solicitor for the mother that I could take judicial notice of the fact (see section 145, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)) that given neither of the parties had undertaken an intake interview and that it was coming towards the end of the year with Christmas and the school holidays soon upon us, that considerable difficulties might be experience in that occurring. That combines with the n
“otoriously significant demands on contact centres when compared to the capacity to meet that demand. Ross and Comcare (19 November 2010)[2010] AATA 928 (Senior Member K S Levy RFD, and)”
Guiding proposition:
I suggested to the solicitor for the mother that I could take judicial notice of the fact (see section 145, Evidence Act 1995 (Cth)) that given neither of the parties had undertaken an intake...